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LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MIGRANT TRAINEES IN JAPAN: 
USING INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS TO EVALUATE 
SHIFTS IN JAPANESE IMMIGRATION POLICY 
SHIKHA SILLIMAN BHATTACHARJEE* 
Japan’s steady decline in population since 2005, combined with 
the low national birth rate, has led to industrial labor shortages, 
particularly in farming, fishing, and small manufacturing 
industries. 1   Japan’s dual labor market structure leaves smaller 
firms and subcontractors with labor shortages in times of both 
economic growth and recession. 2   As a result, small-scale 
manufacturers and employers in these industries are increasingly 
reliant upon foreign workers, particularly from China, Vietnam, 
Indonesia, and the Philippines.3 
Temporary migration programs, designed to allow migrant 
workers to reside and work in a host country without creating a 
permanent entitlement to residence, have the potential to address 
the economic needs of both sending and receiving countries.4  In 
fact, the United Nations Global Commission on International 
Migration recommends:  “states and the private sector should 
consider the option of introducing carefully designed temporary 
migration programmes as a means of addressing the economic 
needs of both countries of origin and destination.”5  “Most high-
                                                     
*  Shikha Silliman Bhattacharjee is a Fellow in the Asia Division at Human 
Rights Watch. 
1  Apichai Shipper, Contesting Foreigner’s Rights in Contemporary Japan, N.C. J. 
INT’L L. & COM. REG., 505-06 (2011). 
2  Ritu Vij, Review, 64 J. ASIAN STUD. 469-71 (May 2005) (reviewing HIROSHI 
KOMAI, FOREIGN MIGRANTS IN CONTEMPORARY JAPAN (2001)).  
3  Shipper, supra note 1, at 506.  
4  This definition does not exclude the possibility that migrants admitted to 
host countries may be granted permanent residence.  See Martin Ruhs, The 
Potential of Temporary Migration Programmes in Future International Migration Policy, 
145 INT’L LAB. REV. 7, 8-13 (2006) (providing a nuanced definition of temporary 
migration programs as well as delineating discrete typologies of such programs). 
5  Summary of the Report of the Global Commission on International 
Migration, U.N. Doc. UN/POP/MIG-FCM/2005/09 (Oct. 13, 2005). 
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income industrialized countries recognize a need for both high and 
low skill migrant labor.” 6   Currently, temporary migration 
programs exist in varied forms, differing with regard to the 
mechanisms for admitting migrant workers, policies for selecting 
migrants, rights granted to workers after admission and primary 
policy objectives.7 
Any temporary migration program, however, “involves at least 
some trade-off between the economic gains typically associated 
with access to labour markets in high-income countries” and 
“restrictions of some of the individual rights of migrants.”8  For 
instance, in order to align migration with sector-specific need, 
temporary migration programs usually restrict migrant workers’ 
right to freedom of movement within the labor market of the host 
country.9   
Migrant workers filling vacancies in low-skill sectors are 
particularly vulnerable to human rights abuses.  “[G]iven the wide 
income inequalities between high and low-income countries, 
migrant workers are sometimes willing to trade economic gains for 
restrictions in personal rights to an extent that may well be 
considered unacceptable in most liberal democracies.”10  Examples 
of low-skill occupations include jobs in the hospitality sector, 
construction, cleaning, agriculture, food processing, and small-
scale manufacturing.  This paper considers whether recent policy 
shifts in Japan’s trainee program are sufficient to safeguard the 
rights of these temporary migrant workers. 
Temporary migrants who have entered Japan legally under the 
residence status “trainee” and “technical intern” form a subset of 
the migrant labor force in Japan.  In 2009, there were 80,480 
trainees in Japan, a decline of 21% compared to the previous year, 
likely due to the global recession.11  Most trainees were in their 
twenties and came from China (78.8%), Vietnam (10%), Indonesia 
                                                     
6   Ruhs, supra note 4, at 14.  
7   See id. at 10 (discussing various forms of temporary worker programs).     
8   Id. at 23.  
9   Id.  
10  Id.  
11  This decline in 2009 reflects both a decrease in the number of foreign 
workers newly entering as trainees, and an increase in the number of trainees who 
transferred to the status of technical intern.  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JAPAN, Basic Plan 
for Immigration Control (4th edition): Provisional Translation, at 8-10 (Mar. 2010), 
available at http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/seisaku/keikaku_101006_english.pdf.  
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(7.15%), the Philippines, and Thailand (4%). 12   The “trainee” 
designation is part of a broader system of differentiation used by 
the Japanese Ministry of Justice to categorize foreign workers 
based upon their national origin and purpose for entering Japan.13 
In an interview with The Asahi, the director of a sewing industry 
association in Hiroshima insisted that the foreign trainee system is 
indispensable to small Japanese companies, who, without it, would 
be forced to move overseas.14 
The original trainee program, initiated in 1981, authorized 
young workers to enter Japan, ostensibly to receive technical 
training in industrial fields, but in reality created “another 
potential channel for the legal introduction of unskilled foreign 
labour in an explicit manner.”15  Not considered workers under the 
Immigration Control Act, trainees were not entitled to minimum 
wages, not protected by labor laws, and routinely subjected to 
exploitation and abuse.  In 2009, however, amendments to Japan’s 
Immigration Control Act extended legal protection under the 
Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and other labor-
related laws and regulations to migrant workers who enter Japan 
with the immigration status “trainee.”16 
This paper uses international human rights instruments as a 
benchmark to evaluate the July 2009 protections extended to 
migrant trainees under Japanese law.  The first section traces the 
evolution of the trainee program from 1971 to the present, details 
the features of the program that facilitate exploitation of trainees 
and concludes with an analysis of the recent attempt by the 
Japanese government to remedy the exploitative features of the 
program.  The second section reviews relevant human rights 
instruments, including the International Labour Organization and 
United Nations Conventions.  The third section applies these 
international standards to evaluate the recent protections extended 
by the Japanese government to migrant trainees.  Finally, the 
fourth section concludes with recommendations for advancing the 
rights of migrant trainees in Japan. 
                                                     
12  Shipper, supra note 1, at 515; MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 8. 
13  Shipper, supra note 1, at 506-07.  
14  Philip Brasor, Immigrant Workers in Japan Caught in a Racket, JAPAN FOCUS, 
(July 8, 2007), http://www.japanfocus.org/-Philip-Brasor/2464. 
15  HIROMI MORI, IMMIGRATION POLICY AND FOREIGN WORKERS IN JAPAN 114 
(1997). 
16  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26-27. 
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1.  MIGRANT TRAINEES IN JAPAN 
1.1. Evolution of the Trainee Program 
The “trainee” category was first created in 1971 in response to 
demands from Japanese business associations to import unskilled 
foreign labor.17  The initial plan was modest, importing only 5,000 
unskilled foreign workers.18  The current iteration of the “trainee” 
category finds its roots in the 1981 revision of Japan’s Immigration 
Control Act.19  The 1981 revision allows low-wage workers to enter 
Japan under the stipulation that they “are not permitted to deviate 
from technical intern training activities.” 20  Under this scheme, 
trainees are not legally entitled to work.  Their compensation is 
limited to commuting and living expense, and they are not 
protected by Japanese labor laws. 
In 1990, the Immigration Control Act was reformed drastically, 
triggered by the accelerated presence of clandestine foreign 
workers. 21   In 1992, the government instituted the Technical 
Internship Program, allowing trainees who pass evaluations from 
the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO) 
to work legally in Japan for two years.22  JITCO simultaneously 
                                                     
17  David Bartram, Japan and Labor Migration: Theoretical and Methodological 
Implications of Negative Cases, 34 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 5, 17-18 (2000) (citing the 
1970 resolution by the Japanese Chamber of Commerce and Industry urging the 
government to explore the option of importing labor and the 1970 “Demand on 
Next Year’s Labor Policy” issued by The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry). 
18  See id. (discussing the limited nature of the plan, while making reference to 
a Labor Ministry announcement that the intent was to import only 5,000 workers). 
19  The Immigration Control Act was enacted in 1951, initially in the form of a 
Cabinet Order.  It became effective in 1952 with the issuance of the Law on the 
Effect of Directives Concerning the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  The existing law 
has been revised 19 times since its inception.  Despite revisions, the principal 
legislative framework has been maintained without substantial modification.  The 
1981 revision of the Immigration Control Act corresponds with Japan’s increased 
dependence upon foreign workers in the 1980’s.  See MORI, supra note 15, at 2, 32.  
See also Keiko Yamanaka, New Immigration Policy and Unskilled Foreign Workers in 
Japan, 66 PAC. AFF. 79-80 (1993) (detailing demographic trends during the first 
decade of the trainee program).  
20  JAPAN INT’L TRAINING COOPERATION ORG., INDUSTRIAL TRAINING AND 
TECHNICAL INTERNSHIP PROGRAMS: OPERATIVE MANUAL FOR SENDING 
ORGANIZATIONS 62 (2009), available at 
http://www.jitco.or.jp/download/data/okuridashi_English.pdf. 
21  Yamanaka, supra note 19, at 75-76 (attributing the growing awareness of 
the mistreatment of illegal workers to mass media). 
22  JITCO, a semi-governmental organization founded in 1991, is a 
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provided incremental increases in legal protections for trainees 
who completed their first year in the program, 23  and allowed 
smaller companies to band together and form associations to 
collectively receive groups of trainees.  Associations are usually 
created by industry groups that recruit trainees in order to alleviate 
labor shortages.24  The practice of allowing aggregation by smaller 
companies decreased direct oversight over trainee placements—
increasing the potential for abuse.  Viewed as a whole, the 
immigration policy reforms of the early 1990’s ostensibly kept the 
‘front door’ closed, while simultaneously meeting the growing 
demand for unskilled labor by allowing de facto foreign workers to 
enter Japan through intentionally provided ‘side-doors.’25 
1.2. Exploitation of Trainees 
The flaws in Japan’s trainee program have been widely 
acknowledged since the first decade of its operation. 26   The 
underlying concept of the system, to transmit industrial skills to 
foreign workers, implicitly places trainees in situations where they 
are subject to exploitation.27  There are few industrial skills that can 
                                                     
partnership between five Japanese Ministries: Justice; Foreign Affairs; Health, 
Labour and Welfare; Economy, Trade and Industry; and Land, Infrastructure and 
Transport.  Overview of the System, JAPAN INT’L TRAINING COOPERATION ORG. (2011), 
available at http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/index.html; Shipper, supra 
note 1 (manuscript at 111).  It is suggested, though not formally documented, that 
many of those running JITCO derived their position through amakudari from the 
various ministries mentioned above.  See Brasor, supra note 14. 
23  The Technical Internship Program (TIP), operated by JITCO, permits 
trainees designated by JITCO to work legally for two years.  As legal foreign 
workers, they are entitled to receive Japan’s National Health Insurance and 
Worker’s Compensation Insurance.  See Shipper, supra note 1, at 515.  
24  Hiroshi Matsubara, Training Scheme Exploits Foreigners, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 
7, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/2000/04/07/announcements/training-
scheme-exploits-foreigners/#.VBVDc0vMZFY. 
25  MORI, supra note 15.  See also Yamanaka, supra note 19, at 76-78 (comparing 
Japan’s trainee program to U.S. government policy toward migrant workers from 
Asia and Latin America).  
26  See HIROSHI KOMAI, MIGRANT WORKERS IN JAPAN 37–54 (1993) (detailing, 
inter alia, the poverty of working conditions and low compensation); HARUO 
SHIMADA, JAPAN’S “GUEST WORKERS” 39 (1994) (“The problem . . . is the 
tremendous gap between Japan’s official legal position on the acceptance of 
foreign workers and the real state of affairs, and the absence, or ambiguity, or 
regulations that might bridge this gap.”).  
27  See Haruo Shimada, The Employment of Foreign Labor in Japan, in 513 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., JAPAN’S EXTERNAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: 
JAPANESE PERSPECTIVES 117, 126 (1991) (discussing how the trainee system can be 
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be learned without actually performing industrial activities.28  As a 
result, by program design, trainees are made to work in industrial 
sectors and compensated with a training allowance that is only a 
small fraction of the normal market wage.29  In 2010, the Japanese 
Ministry of Justice reported that “the number . . . [of] trainees and 
technical interns being treated like low-wage workers . . . has been 
on the increase . . . .”30 
Misconduct by organizations receiving trainees is rampant and 
well documented.  According to Ministry of Justice statistics, the 
number of organizations deemed to have committed misconduct 
reached a record high of 452 organizations in 2008, and declined to 
360 organizations in 2009—in part due to the significant decline in 
the number of trainees entering Japan that year. 31   Nearly all 
recorded abuses—358 out of 360 officially acknowledged abuses in 
2009—took place in association-supervised systems of placement.32 
According to the Ministry of Justice, “some accepting 
organizations do not provide adequate guidance and supervision 
for their umbrella organizations, and there are brokers who obtain 
unfair profits from intermediary services.”33  
The Ministry of Justice divides misconduct into three major 
categories that account for the majority of recorded violations: 
violations against labor-related regulations, including unpaid 
wages; ‘work in excess of statutory working hours;’ and ‘name 
lending’—the practice of allowing other organizations that have 
not completed formal application procedures to accept trainees 
and technical interns.34  These three categories account for 76.6% of 
all misconduct.35  
                                                     
used to exploit foreign workers because trainees cannot be paid during the 
training period for actual work performed, but instead are paid a lower rate 
through payment of a training allowance). 
28  Id. at 126.  
29  Id.  
30  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 10-11. 
31  Id.  
32  Id. 
33  Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry 
of Justice, Japan, Measures on the Training and Technical Internship Programs, in 2010 
IMMIGRATION CONTROL 89, available at www.moj.go.jp/content/000058064.pdf. 
34  Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry 
of Justice, Japan, Measures on the Training and Technical Internship Programs: 
Response to Cases of Inappropriate Acceptance, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 90, 
available at www.moj.go.jp/content/000058064.pdf. 
35  Id.  
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Organization misconduct, however, goes far beyond treating 
trainees as low-wage workers.  In addition to the three major 
categories cited above, the government acknowledges a category of 
abuse entitled “malicious acts of infringement of human rights.”36 
For instance, in 2007, six Vietnamese women in their twenties, 
accepted by the Toyota Technology Exchange Association and sent 
to a third-tier subcontractor, where they worked in the production 
of vehicle seat parts, sued the subcontractor for withholding 
wages, subjecting them to sexual harassment, and preventing them 
from escaping by confiscating their passports and bank books.37 
Similarly, in 2008, three Chinese women filed a damages lawsuit 
against two farms where, rather than receive training in tomato 
farming as promised, their passports were confiscated and they 
were forced to pick strawberries, work overtime without breaks, 
and were even dispatched to other farms to work.38 
Most alarmingly, between 2005 and 2010, at least 127 trainees 
(or one in 2,600 trainees) died on the job, mostly due to the strain of 
excessive labor.39  Under Japanese law, when a worker dies from 
brain or heart disease and either their overtime hours were in 
excess of 100 in the month before their death, or the average 
monthly overtime was more than 80 hours for a period of at least 
two months before their death, overwork (karoshi) is recognized as 
the cause of death.40  According to JITCO, “the rate of death of 
heart disease of trainees and technical interns was almost double 
                                                     
36  Id. at 91.  
37  Foreign Female Interns to Sue Toyota Subcontractor, JAPAN TIMES (Mar. 9, 
2007), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2007/03/09/national/foreign-female-
interns-to-sue-toyota-subcontractor/.  
38  Trainee Trio File Suit Against Kunamoto Farms, Agencies, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 
10, 2008), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2008/04/10/national/trainee-trio-
file-suit-against-kumamoto-farms-agencies/#.VBVDRkvMZFY. 
39  Shipper, supra note 1, at 517; see also Simon Scott, Dying to Work: Japan Inc.’s 
Foreign Trainees, JAPAN TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), 
http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2010/08/03/issues/dying-to-work-
japan-inc-s-foreign-trainees/#.VBVCqUvMZFY (documenting the first time 
Japanese authorities recognized that a foreign trainee effectively worked himself 
to death: an official ruling from the Kashima Labor Standards Inspection Office 
held that 31-year-old Chinese trainee, Jiang Xiaodong, died of karoshi—death from 
overwork).  
40  Scott, supra note 39 (quoting Hiroshi Kawahito, a Japanese labor lawyer 
who explains that, while it is impossible to conclusively prove an instance of 
death from overwork, if one looks at the overall pattern of a person’s life, it is 
clear in many cases that the physical and mental stress of long working hours was 
fatal). 
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the rate for Japanese of the same age.”41  The ratio of trainees who 
have died from karoshi is particularly high considering that nearly 
all trainees are young people who must pass rigorous physical 
examinations to enter the program.42 
Japan International Training Cooperation Organization, 
responsible for overseeing trainee placements, has failed to 
intervene on behalf of trainees, even when abuses are brought 
directly to their attention.43  As JITCO has become increasingly 
autonomous, the organization has taken on the culture of a private 
company.44  JITCO’s total income for the 2008 financial year was 
¥2.94 billion and more than half this amount, ¥1.66 billion, came 
from “support membership fees” paid by companies receiving 
trainees. 45   Industry officials told The Mainichi newspaper that 
JITCO treats them as customers and is willing to look the other 
way with regard to common illegal practices such as confiscating 
trainee passports and fourteen-hour workdays.46  “One employer 
said appreciatively that JITCO calls him beforehand to tell him 
when they are coming for a surprise inspection.”47  This lack of 
oversight from JITCO has allowed placement organizations to 
behave with impunity. 
Under this system, foreign trainees and technical interns had 
little recourse.  During their first year of the program, Labor 
Standards Offices could do nothing for them because the Labor 
Standards Act did not apply.48  After their first year, trainees who 
achieved the legal status designation “intern” were technically 
entitled to legal recourse under the Labor Standards Act but 
typically had limited knowledge of the law and rarely brought 
their grievances to the offices. 49  Alternate avenues of recourse 
were also largely foreclosed.  Although trainees could petition the 
Immigration Bureau of the Ministry of Justice if they did not 
                                                     
41  Id.   
42  Shipper, supra note 1, at 517.  
43  Foreign Female Interns to Sue Toyota Subcontractor, supra note 37. 
44  Brasor, supra note 14. 
45  Scott, supra note 39 (quoting Lila Abiko of the Lawyer’s Network for 
Trainees). 
46 Brasor, supra note 14.  
47  Brasor, supra note 14.  
48  Hiroshi Matsubara, Training Scheme Exploits Foreigners, JAPAN TIMES (Apr. 
7, 2000), http://www.japantimes.co.jp/2000/04/07/announcements/training-
scheme-exploits-foreigners/#.VBVCVEvMZFY. 
49  Id.  
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receive any training at their firms, the Ministry could only penalize 
the firms by suspending their permission to accept trainees—a 
practice which resulted in immediate deportation for trainees 
working at that location.50 
1.3. 2009 Amendments to Japan’s Immigration Control Act 
In July 2009, the Japanese government amended the 
Immigration Control Act, revising the trainee and technical intern 
system.51  The new system, effective from July 1, 2010, replaced the 
trainee and technical internship categories with a new visa 
category entitled “on the job trainee” or “practical trainee.” 52 
Under this revised system, practical trainees complete a two-
month language and training program at the beginning of their 
contract. 53   Upon completing this condensed training program, 
practical trainees will become eligible as “workers” under the 
Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and other labor-
related laws and regulations.54  The maximum length of stay for on 
the job trainees will remain three years.55 
The 2009 revision signals a basic recognition that trainees are 
entitled to protection under the law.  As of July 1, 2010, 
organizations that have acted inappropriately regarding training 
and technical internships will be suspended from the program for 
three years. 56   In order to reinforce supervision of trainee 
placements, a new Ministry of Justice ordinance requires the staff 
of supervising organizations to visit the facility where programs 
are conducted at least once a month to confirm that the situation of 
trainees conforms to program guidelines. 57   In addition, board 
                                                     
50  Id.  
51  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26. 
52  Although the “trainee” residency status still exists for foreign workers 
who arrived before 2010, it is currently being phased out and, from 2011, all first-
year participants in the program will be classed as practical trainees.  See Shipper, 
supra note 1, at 545 (describing government revisions to the trainee and technical 
intern system); MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26 (describing Japanese 
efforts to ensure appropriate training and technical internship programs). 
53  Shipper, supra note 1, at 545.  
54  MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, supra note 11, at 26. 
55  Shipper, supra note 1, at 545.  
56  Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry 
of Justice, Japan, Points on 2010 Immigration Control, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 
90, available at www.moj.go.jp/content/000058064.pdf. 
57  Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry 
of Justice, Japan, Measures on the Training and Technical Internship Programs: Actions 
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members of supervising organizations must conduct an audit 
every three months, and organizations are required to provide 
counseling staff to advise technical interns.58 
Naomi Hayazaki, an advocate for trainees, who has been 
involved with the Rights of Immigrants Network in Kansai (RINK) 
since 2000, links the July 2009 revision of the Immigration Control 
Act to an increasing awareness by the government that the trainee 
program was deeply flawed:  “[W]hen we first started, the 
government dismissed the problem as something only relevant to a 
few bad companies . . . .  [B]ut in these ten years, they have realized 
that it is not merely one part, that it is a big problem.  The change 
in July was also a result of that recognition.”59 
The remainder of this paper considers these changes in context 
of international human rights instruments aimed at protecting 
migrant workers.  Section 2 provides an overview of relevant 
human rights conventions.  Section 3 delineates Japan’s 
commitment to international human rights instruments protecting 
migrant workers and evaluates the practical impact of the 2009 
revisions to the Immigration Control Act.  Finally, Section 4 
concludes with recommendations for safeguarding the rights of 
migrant trainees in Japan. 
2.  INTERNATIONAL BENCHMARKS:  HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS 
PROTECTING MIGRANT WORKERS 
Both the International Labour Organization (ILO) and United 
Nations (UN) Conventions protect migrant workers.  This section 
begins by providing an overview of relevant human rights 
instruments: ILO Convention 97, Migration for Employment 
(1949); ILO Convention 143, Migrant Workers Convention 
(Supplementary Provisions) (1975); and the United Nations 
International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (1990) (ICMR).  Although most of 
the rights contained in the United Nations human rights treaty 
system also apply to non-citizens and thus provide basic protection 
for migrant workers and their families, this paper focuses on 
                                                     
for Improvement of the System, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 89, available at 
www.moj.go.jp/content/000058062.pdf. 
58  Id. 
59  Jody Godoy, Abuse Rife Within Trainee System, Say NGOs, JAPAN TIMES, Dec. 
7, 2010, http://www.japantimes.co.jp/community/2010/12/07/issues/abuse-
rife-within-trainee-system-say-ngos/#.VBVBtUvMZFY. 
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international instruments focused primarily on advancing the 
human rights of migrant workers. 
2.1. ILO Conventions Protecting Migrant Workers Rights 
The Constitution of the International Labour Organization 
clearly assigns the ILO the task of protecting “the interests of 
workers when employed in countries other than their own.” 60 
Accordingly, within the UN system, setting standards for 
protecting migrant workers officially falls within the domain of the 
ILO. 61   There are two ILO conventions expressly dedicated to 
safeguarding the rights of migrant workers. 
The first, ILO Convention 97, Migration for Employment was 
adopted in 1949 and came into force in 1952.62  Convention 97 
consists of general provisions safeguarding the rights of migrant 
workers and three optional annexes.  Among other stipulations, 
under the general provisions ratifying states are required to 
provide migrant workers with accurate information on national 
policies, laws, and regulations relating to migration; facilitate 
migration for employment; maintain appropriate medical services; 
prevent discrimination; and provide equal treatment under the 
law, on par with the treatment afforded nationals, with respect to 
remuneration, collective bargaining, social security, taxation, and 
legal recourse.63  The three annexes to Convention 97 cover (1) 
recruitment and conditions of labor for migrant workers, (2) 
government sponsored group transfer, and (3) exemption from 
customs duties.  Governments are given the option of excluding 
any of the annexes from ratification.  Forty-nine countries have 
ratified ILO Convention 97 to date. 
The second, ILO Convention 143, Migrant Workers Convention 
(Supplementary Provisions), was adopted in 1975 and came into 
force in 1978.  Convention 143 has two substantive parts:  (1) 
Migrations in Abusive Conditions and (2) Equality of Opportunity 
                                                     
60  Convention (No. 143) Concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and 
the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers, 
pmbl., June 24, 1975, 1120 U.N.T.S. 323 [hereinafter ILO Convention 143]. 
61  Roger Bohning, The ILO and the New UN Convention on Migrant Workers: 
The Past and Future, 25 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 698, 700 (1991) (assessing the ILO’s 
role in developing international measures to aid migrant workers). 
62  Convention (No. 97) Concerning Migration for Employment (Revised 
1949), Jan. 7, 1949, 120 U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter ILO Convention 97]. 
63  Id. 
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and Treatment.  The first substantive component of Convention 
No. 143 is primarily concerned with irregular migrant workers—
migrant workers who have entered a host country illegally 
whether voluntarily or due to forced trafficking.  Ratifying 
countries are called upon to detect and suppress illegal 
employment by prosecuting employers and agents who engage in 
trafficking.64  The second substantive component concerns equality 
of opportunity and treatment for migrant workers who lawfully 
enter a host country. 65   Ratifying states have the option of 
excluding either part of the convention.   
Despite the option to selectively ratify each component, 
Convention No. 143 faced significant resistance when it came up 
for adoption by the International Labour Conference. 66   States, 
employers, and workers’ organizations from developing countries 
objected to the Convention because it threatened to cut off 
employment opportunities and foreign exchange remittances from 
illegally employed migrants from developing countries.67  Only 23 
countries have ratified ILO Convention 143 to date.68  
2.2. UN International Convention on the Protection of All Migrants 
Workers and Members of Their Families 
The 1990 United Nations International Convention on the 
Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families 
(ICMR) officially entered into force on July 1, 2003.69  Intervening 
in the conflict between state sovereignty and human rights, the 
ICMR defines the category migrant worker, clarifies the full 
application of human rights law to migrant workers, and traces the 
rights of workers through the entire migration process.  The types 
of migrants covered range from skilled to unskilled and include 
itinerant, project tied, those in specified employment, self-
employed migrant workers, and seasonal workers.  Thirty-three 
                                                     
64  ILO Convention 143, at art. 3. 
65  ILO Convention 143, at Part II. 
66  Bohning, supra note 61, at 699.  
67  Id. at 700.  
68  Ratifications of C143-Migrant Workers (Supplemental Provisions) Convention, 
1975 No. 143, INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO:11300:P
11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312288:NO. 
69  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families, Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter ICMR]. 
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states are currently signatories of the ICMR. 
Comprised of nine sections, the ICMR is considered the first 
comprehensive codification of the rights of migrant workers and 
their families in a single human rights instrument.  Article 1 
provides a broad definition of migrant workers, including a 
distinction between regular (documented) workers and irregular 
(undocumented) workers.70  Article 7 sets forth a principle of non-
discrimination—providing that States should enforce the rights 
contained in the Convention without distinction.71  Part III of the 
ICMR (Articles 8–35) grants broad human rights to all migrant 
workers and members of their families, irrespective of their 
migratory status.72  Article 37 confers additional rights for migrant 
workers who are documented or regular. 73  Part VI provides a 
framework for international migration particularly oriented 
toward eliminating trafficking and smuggling of migrants.  Finally, 
Article 72 requires that implementation of the ICMR be monitored 
by the Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
Workers and Members of Their Families.74 
The last of the seven core UN international human rights 
treaties that together form the United Nations human rights treaty 
system, the ICMR is smaller than the other conventions and was 
not initially given immediate priority or widely promoted. 75 
Beginning in the late 1990’s, however, the ICMR gained authority 
due to a confluence of factors.  These factors include establishment 
of the Steering Committee of the Global Campaign for Ratification 
of the ICMR, an alliance involving the UN Secretariat, 
intergovernmental agencies and international human rights, 
church, labor, migrant, and women’s organizations.  First 
convened in 1998, the work of the Steering Committee has led to a 
sharp increase in the number of ratifications and signatures to the 
                                                     
70  See ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 1. 
71  ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 7. 
72  ICMR, supra note 69, at arts. 8-35. 
73  ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 37. 
74  See ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 72 (discussing implementation measures 
for the convention, including discussion of a committee for monitoring purposes).   
75  Robyn Iredale & Nicola Piper, UNESCO Int’l Migration & Multicultural 
Policies Sec., Identification of the Obstacles to the Signing and Ratification of the UN 
Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers: The Asia-Pacific 
Perspective 13, in UNESCO SERIES OF COUNTRY REPORTS ON THE RATIFICATION OF THE 
UN CONVENTION ON MIGRANTS (Oct. 2003), available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001395/139528e.pdf.  
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ICMR—prior to 1998 only nine states had ratified the 
Convention.76 
Additionally, the first UN Special Rapporteur on Human 
Rights of Migrants was appointed in 1999. 77   The Special 
Rapporteur is charged with receiving information from migrants 
concerning violations of their rights, issuing recommendation to 
correct such violations, promoting the application of international 
legal instruments and recommending policies to advance migrants 
rights at the national, regional and international levels.78 
Finally, increased support for the ICMR can be attributed to 
“intensified civil society activism, notably in Asia which has the 
most advanced migrant worker NGOs and regional networks.”79 
The Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA) was established in 1994, 
following the First Regional Conference organized by the Asian 
Migrant Centre in Hsinchu, Taiwan.80  Initially meant to serve as a 
mechanism to monitor the implementation of conference 
recommendations, it has since evolved into a regional network that 
provides advocacy and direct services to migrant workers in all 
phases of the migration cycle.81  The broadest regional network 
dedicated to advancing migrants rights, the MFA is comprised of 
23 member organizations, including migrant workers associations 
and unions, NGOs, religious organizations, national networks, and 
women’s NGOs.  Member organizations represent 5 labor-sending 
countries—Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nepal, the Philippines and Sri 
Lanka; and 5 labor-receiving countries—Hong Kong, Japan, 
Malaysia, South Korea and Taiwan.82 
2.3. Relationship Between ILO Conventions and the UN International 
Convention on Protection of All Migrants Workers and Members 
of Their Families 
Due in part to ILO participation in the drafting of the ICMR, 
                                                     
76  OFF. OF U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTION ON MIGRANT WORKERS AND ITS COMMITTEE: FACT SHEET NO. 24 (REV. 1), 
at 3 (2005) [hereinafter ICMR Fact Sheet].  
77  Id. at 14.  
78  Id.  
79  Iredale & Piper, supra note 75, at 13.  
80  Mary Lou L. Alcid, The Multilevel Approach to Promoting Asian Migrant 
Workers’ Rights: The MFA Experience, 42 INT’L MIGRATION 169, 171-72 (2004).  
81  Id.  
82  Id. at 172. 
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there is significant overlap between the ICMR and ILO instruments 
safeguarding migrant’s rights.  Of the 27 substantive Articles in 
Part III of the ICMR, 15 are covered by ILO Conventions or 
Recommendations; of the twenty substantive Articles in Part IV, 17 
are covered by ILO Conventions and Recommendations; and, 
finally, of the 8 substantive Articles in Part VII, 6 are covered by 
existing ILO standards.83 
With regard to conflict between ILO instruments and the 
ICMR, the progressive development of human right standards 
requires that later instruments more favorable to individuals be 
adopted over earlier ones. 84  Accordingly, when in conflict, the 
ICMR supersedes preexisting ILO standards.  Conflict between 
ILO instruments and the ICMR are most pronounced with respect 
to social security and free choice of employment.85 
2.4. Status of Trainees Under International Human Rights Law 
Trainees fall within the definition of “migrant for employment” 
under the ILO Migrant Workers Convention, No. 97.86  The ICMR 
broadens this definition, defining a migrant worker as “a person 
who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a 
remunerated activity in a State of which he or she is not a 
national.” 87  While these definitions imply inclusion of trainees 
who engage in labor for remuneration, both the ILO Migrant 
Workers Convention (Supplementary Provisions), No. 143 and the 
ICMR contain explicit provisions that exclude “trainees” from 
protection.88 
This explicit contradiction does not, however, necessarily 
foreclose protection under international law for trainees who both 
receive training and engage in remunerated employment.  “The 
complexity of the present day migration stream has intensified 
with distinctions between migrant workers, trainees, tourists, 
refugees and displaced persons becoming increasingly blurred.”89 
                                                     
83  Bohning, supra note 61, at 705.  
84  Id.  
85  Id.  
86  ILO Convention 97, supra note 62, at art. 11.  
87  ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 2(1).  
88  ILO Convention 143, supra note 60, at art. 11(d); ICMR, supra note 69, at art. 
3(e). 
89  Piyasiri Wickramasekera, Asian Labour Migration: Issues and Challenges in an 
Era of Globalization, Int’l Labour Org. International Migration Papers No. 57, 2 
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With regard to trainees, this distinction is particularly tenuous 
because “on the job training” is difficult to distinguish from actual 
labor. 
Challenges associated with distinguishing trainees from 
migrant workers were raised during the United Nations Working 
Group discussion of Article 3 of the ICMR.  The Swedish 
representative, during the discussion, proposed that students and 
trainees engaged in remunerated work must be protected under 
the ICMR.90  Despite significant endorsement of this perspective, 
the Working Group retained the wording “students and 
trainees.” 91   Upon closing the session, however, a Finnish 
representative provided the following definition of student:  
The term ‘student’ refers to a person who has been 
admitted to a state of which he is a national to pursue a 
full-time course of studies; a student is a migrant 
worker when he engages in remunerated activity that 
is not considered to be part of his course of study in 
that state.92   
Based upon these discussions, protection for migrant trainees 
within Japan is consistent with the scope of the ICMR. 
 
3. JAPAN’S NATIONAL COMMITMENT TO RIGHTS AT WORK FOR 
MIGRANT WORKERS 
3.1. Commitment to International Human Rights Instruments 
Protecting Migrant Workers 
Historically, Japan has maintained an ambivalent relationship 
to international norms.  Japan’s approach to international norms 
“is not necessarily resistant to their content” but also “does not see 
them as integral to state identity.” 93   Prior to 1979, Japan had 
                                                     
(Aug. 2002). 
90  Yazuo Kitamura, Recent Developments in Japanese Immigration Policy and the 
United Nations Convention of Migrant Workers, 27 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 113, 127 
(1993). 
91  Id.  
92  Id.  
93  See Amy Gurowitz, Mobilizing International Norms: Domestic Actors, 
Immigrants, and the Japanese State, 51 WORLD POLITICS 415, 424 (1999) (reaching this 
conclusion based upon a historical analysis of Japan’s entry into international 
society and themes in Japanese state identity dating back to the Meiji period).  
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ratified only two international human rights agreements. 94  
Following six years of intense, sustained pressure from Japanese 
and international NGOs, in 1979, the Japanese government ratified 
the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 
and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR).95 
Since 1979, Japan has ratified a number of additional treaties.  
In addition to ICCPR and ICESCR, Japan has signed and ratified 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC), the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), and the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment (CAT).96  Although there is no National 
Commission for Human Rights in Japan, in the last fifteen years, a 
number of agencies have been established to promote human 
rights—the Promotion Council for Human Rights Education 
(1995), the Council for Human Rights Protection (1997), and the 
Human Rights Forum 21 (1997). 
Despite this increased commitment to international human 
rights, Japan has not ratified ILO Convention 97, Migration for 
Employment; ILO Convention 143, Migrant Workers Convention 
(Supplementary Provisions); and has taken a firm stance in 
opposition to the ICMR.97  In a statement issued in 1990, following 
the adoption of the ICMR by the General Assembly, the Japanese 
government expressed several reservations.  These include concern 
that the Conventions advocate more favorable treatment for 
migrant workers than is currently legislated for nationals and other 
foreigners; potential clashes with Japan’s Constitution; and 
implications for Japan’s basic immigration policies.98  In addition, 
Japan usually follows international trends when ratifying UN 
documents.  Absent ratification from the G7 countries and other 
                                                     
94  Id. at 426. 
95  Id. at 426-29 (tracing the political context and mobilization efforts in the 
lead up to the ratification of these treaties). 
96  Masahiro Tabuchi, Director-General of the Immigration Bureau, Ministry 
of Justice, Japan, Addressing the Global Community: Section 1, Treaties and 
International Conventions, in 2010 IMMIGRATION CONTROL 89, 102-03,  available at 
www.moj.go.jp/content/000058062.pdf. 
97  See Iredale & Piper, supra note 75, at 26 (noting the agreements Japan has 
signed, which do not list the named documents).  
98  Id. at 29. 
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high-income migrant-receiving countries, Japan has not felt 
compelled to ratify the ICMR.99  Finally, the Japanese Ministry of 
Labor typically discusses ratification of ILO instruments with trade 
unions prior to recommending ratification and Japanese trade 
unions have not made conventions safeguarding migrant workers 
a priority in their advocacy.100 
3.2. Challenges to Accessing Legal Protection Under Japanese Labor 
Law 
The capacity for a temporary migration program to balance the 
economic needs of the host country with the human rights of 
migrant workers depends upon the fulfillment of three basic 
prerequisites:  first, a strong policy commitment to enforcing 
immigration and employment laws, especially against employers; 
second, active regulation of the cost at which migrant workers are 
made available to employers; and third, effective mechanisms for 
encouraging employers to search for local workers before 
demanding migrant labor.101  The first prerequisite relates most 
directly to protecting rights at work for migrant workers while the 
second and third variables are required to balance competing 
claims to employment by nationals within the host country. 
Maintaining a focus on advancing human rights protection for 
migrant workers, this section considers the first prerequisite: 
whether the 2009 revisions to Japan’s Immigration Control Act are 
sufficient to demonstrate a strong national commitment to 
enforcing immigration and employment laws, especially against 
employers.  More specifically, the question is whether extending 
protection to trainees by considering them workers under the 
Labor Standards Act, the Minimum Wage Act, and other labor-
related laws and regulations is likely to provide real access to 
protective measures.  I consider two dimensions of access to real 
protective measures:  first, access to legal services for migrant 
workers in Japan; and, second, the viability of amended legal 
sanctions against employers. 
3.2.1. Access to Legal Services 
Foreign workers in Japan typically do not receive legal 
                                                     
99   Id. at 27-28. 
100  Id.  
101  See Ruhs, supra note 4, at 16.  
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counsel. 102  The most basic barriers to access include a lack of 
financial resources and personal connections necessary to arrange 
for legal representation.  The challenge of securing legal counsel 
under these conditions is heightened by a tendency by public 
defenders to reject cases involving foreigners because they are 
difficult, usually require interpretation, and offer little financial 
reward.103 
Against this backdrop, most low wage foreign workers access 
legal services through lawyers’ associations and legal NGOs.  
Lawyers associations that provide legal counsel to foreigners, 
include the Lawyers’ Association for Foreign Laborers Rights, 
(LAFLR), The Lawyers Association for Foreign Criminal Cases 
(LAFOCC), and the Immigration Review Task Force.  These 
associations receive basic funding for their activities from regional 
lawyers’ associations. 104   Legal NGOs, by contrast, rely almost 
entirely upon donations.105  The authority wielded by employers 
over the legal status of trainees places an additional burden on 
lawyers associations and legal NGOs.  Trainees occupy a 
particularly precarious immigration status.  Placement with an 
employer is a prerequisite to remaining legally in Japan, and the 
only potential sanction for employers is to suspend permission to 
receive trainees—resulting in immediate deportation for trainees 
working with the offending firm.106 
   
Employers use this dependence to short-circuit legal 
proceedings and avoid paying damages and back pay.   
 
When an intern or trainee goes to report unpaid wages 
to the local labor standards bureau, there have been 
many cases where they return to their domicile or 
workplace to find someone from their hiring company 
or association waiting to force them to return to their 
home country, sometimes making them leave that very 
                                                     
102  Apichai W. Shipper, Foreigners and Civil Society in Japan, 79 PAC. AFF. 269, 
279-80 (2006). 
103  Id.  
104  Id. 
105  See Godoy, supra note 59 (“[T]he advocacy network relies entirely on 
grass-roots support in the form of volunteers and donations . . . .  [T]he network 
receives no funding from the government . . . .”).   
106  Matsubura, supra note 48.  
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day. 107   
In order to avoid these outcomes, legal advocates advise clients to 
leave their place of employment early in the morning on the day 
they make their report and stay in a shelter for the duration of legal 
proceedings. 108   Advocacy groups who help trainees seek 
reparation are, therefore, also required to provide shelter and 
protection for their clients.  In addition to trainees who must flee 
from their place of employment to avoid deportation, trainees 
whose contracts have been broken are evicted from the company 
dorm and usually need a place to stay. 109   Adding to these 
challenges, trainees who file claims against their current employer 
may face intimidation and need protection.110   
3.2.2. Viability of Legal Sanctions Against Employers 
While the 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act 
included increasing punishments for employers who violate the 
dictates of the trainee program, Japan is notorious for weak law 
enforcement.  In fact, it has been argued that no industrial nation 
has weaker law enforcement.111  “Sanctions taken for granted in the 
West, in Europe as well as in the United States, either do not exist 
or remain unused in Japan.”112   
 
Consistent with this reputation, employers who act 
inappropriately regarding trainees do not actually receive 
punishment.  Rather, they lose the privilege of receiving trainees.  
The 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act does not initiate 
additional sanctions.  Instead, the revisions increase the period of 
suspension from the program from one year to three years. 
Typically, in Japan, the paucity of formal legal sanctions is 
balanced, at least in part, by informal, extralegal mechanisms.113  
The most persuasive is ‘loss of face’ or damaged reputation.114  
Accordingly, as in most countries, adverse publicity is a powerful 
                                                     
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Id.  
110  Id.  
111  John O. Haley, Sheathing the Sword of Justice in Japan: An Essay on Law 
Without Sanctions, 8 J. JAPANESE STUD. 265, 265 (1982).  
112  Id.  
113  Id. at 275. 
114  Id.  
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tool in gaining compliance with legal and social norms. 115   In 
addition, ostracism, including refusal to deal with companies that 
violate accepted legal norms incentivizes compliance.116 
Unfortunately, even after the 2009 revision of the Immigration 
Control Act, these informal, extralegal mechanisms for 
incentivizing compliance do not enhance protection for trainees.  
Justice Ministry investigations of trainee exploitation are rarely, if 
ever, made public, even when such investigations result in 
suspension from the program.117  Hiroshi Nakajima, an organizer 
for the Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees,118 described the 
investigation process as a “black box.”119  According to Nakajima, 
questions go unanswered during investigations and the resulting 
suspensions are not even made public.120  More alarmingly still, 
this information is not always available to the public, even upon 
request.  “The network is sometimes able to get information on 
banned companies from the ministry upon request, but not in 
every case,” Nakajima explains. 121   Often, organizations that 
advocate on behalf of trainees only know that a placement 
organization, association, or company has been suspended when 
they find out that the firm no longer receives trainees.122 
Local Labor Standards Offices, at least in Fukui Prefecture, also 
fail to provide relevant public information.123  In 2009, 85% of the 
companies employing trainees that were investigated by the Fukui 
Labor Bureau were found to have committed labor or safety 
infractions. 124   By failing to make the names of offending 
companies public, the Labor Standard Inspection Office protects 
these companies from Ministry of Justice sanctions and allows 
them to continue employing foreign trainees.  These de facto 
policies of shielding companies that violate the rights of trainees 
                                                     
115  Id.  
116  See id. at 277 (suggesting that informal mechanisms of ostracism is one of 
the most effective means of maintaining social order). 
117  Godoy, supra note 59.  
118  The Advocacy Network for Foreign Trainees, started in 1999, is a Tokyo-
based umbrella organization for trainee advocacy groups.  I discuss this 
organization further in Section IV of this paper.  
119  Godoy, supra note 59.  
120  Id.  
121   Id. 
122  Id.  
123  Id. 
124  Id. 
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from public humiliation undermine the potential for extralegal 
sanctions to bolster the legal rights extended to foreign trainees.  
According to Ichiro Takahara of the Fukui Advocacy Network for 
Foreign Trainees, these policies trivialize violations:  “The sense of 
guilt over committing a labor violation is less than that over 
committing a traffic violation.”125 
3.2.3. Evaluation by UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights of 
Migrants 
Invited by the Japanese Government to observe and report on 
the human rights situation of migrants in the country, in March 
2010, UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, 
Jorge Bustamante, spent nine days touring Japan.126  Bustamante 
visited Tokyo, Nagoya, Toyota, and Hamamatsu to meet with 
Ministers, officials of central and local governments, international 
organizations, lawyers, schoolteachers, academics, members of 
civil society organizations, as well as migrant women, men, and 
their children.127 
Despite the 2009 revisions to the Immigration Control Act, 
Bustamante condemned the industrial trainee and technical interns 
program.  In his recommendations, Bustamente described the 
program as “fuel[ing] demand for exploitative cheap labour under 
conditions that constitute violations of the right to physical and 
mental health, physical integrity, freedom of expression and 
movement of foreign trainees and interns.”128  In some cases, he 
noted, these conditions “may well amount to slavery.” 129   In 
addition, he recommended that “urgent measures . . . be taken 
within the judiciary and law enforcement agencies to guarantee the 
effective implementation of the rights of foreigners without 
discrimination.”130 
                                                     
125  Id. (quoting Ichiro Takahara of the Fukui Advocacy Network for Foreign 
Trainees). 
126  UN Migrants Rights Expert Urges Japan to Increase Protection of Migrants, 
OFF. OF U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS. (Mar. 31, 2010), 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=99
50&LangID=E. 
127  Id.  
128  Id. at 2. 
129  Id.  
130  Id.  
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4.  RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
4.1. Incentivizing Compliance with Legal Standards that Protect 
Migrant Workers’ Human Rights at Work 
Under the 2009 revision to the Immigration Control Act, 
Japanese employers who violate the human rights of migrant 
workers do not actually receive punishment but only temporarily 
lose the privilege of employing trainees for three years.  This 
sanction is further diluted by the association-supervised system of 
placement which allows employers who have violated migrants 
rights to apply to receive trainees by joining or forming a new 
association that is not linked to previous abuses. 
To facilitate effective enforcement of employer sanctions, two 
conditions need to be met:  first, implementation of employer 
sanctions must be feasible; and second, there must be a strong 
commitment to enforce the law against employers. 131 
Intermediaries who help evade enforcement and insufficient 
cooperation between agencies jeopardize the feasibility of 
sanctions.132  In addition, Japan’s notoriously weak culture of law 
enforcement significantly decreases the likelihood of a strong 
commitment to enforcing penalties against employers who engage 
in misconduct. 
To enhance the ability of sanctions to feasibly deter and punish 
abuse of migrant trainees, small employers that band together to 
form associations must be held individually accountable for abuses 
against migrant workers.  This requires the Ministry of Justice to 
record sufficient identifying information about all individual 
employers that comprise larger associations; the Labor Standards 
Offices to report labor and safety infractions by employers hiring 
trainees to the Ministry of Justice; and a joint commitment between 
these agencies to insure that employers that engage in abusive 
conduct are prohibited from joining associations in the future. 
In addition, to compensate for Japan’s weak culture of law 
enforcement, the Ministry of Justice must facilitate extralegal 
sanction of employers who violate migrant’s rights.  As previously 
discussed, the paucity of formal legal sanctions in Japan is typically 
                                                     
131  Ruhs, supra note 4, at 17 (defining and applying these criteria to enforcing 
government sanctions against employers who illegally hire irregular migrant 
workers).  
132  Id.  
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balanced, at least in part, by informal, extralegal mechanisms.133  
The most persuasive is damage to reputation.  Currently, however, 
concerning abuses of migrant workers, adverse publicity and 
refusal to deal with companies that violate the law are not effective 
mechanisms for sanction because Ministry of Justice and Labor 
Standards Office investigations of trainee exploitation are rarely 
made public.  Accordingly, to enhance the efficacy of informal 
sanction, the Ministry of Justice must both make information about 
violations available to the public upon request and commit to 
publicizing investigations of employers that result in suspension 
from the program.  Access to this information will empower 
migrant workers and their advocates to independently monitor 
abusive employers and deploy public opinion to demand legal 
compliance. 
4.2. Recourse for Trainees:  Portable Placements Within Sectors and 
Approved Associations 
One of the primary sources of migrants’ vulnerability within 
temporary migration programs is the requirement that they work 
only for the employer specified on their work permit. 134   As 
previously discussed, under the 2009 revisions to the Immigration 
Control Act, trainees continue to occupy a particularly precarious 
immigration status because placement with a particular employer 
is a prerequisite to remaining legally in Japan.  Trainees who seek 
recourse from Local Labor Standards Bureaus are frequently forced 
to leave the country immediately.  Employer accountability is 
further undermined by the illegal practice of retaining migrant 
workers’ passports and making accommodation contingent upon 
submission to employer’s terms.135 
Access to legal recourse from abuse, therefore, “requires at 
least some portability of temporary work permits . . . .”136  While 
unlimited portability of permits across occupations and sectors 
might undermine alignment of temporary workers with industry 
needs, allowing trainees to be mobile among smaller employers 
within industry-specific associations maintains an appropriate 
balance between the economic demands of the host country and 
                                                     
133  See supra Section 3.2.2. 
134  Id. at 23.  
135  Id. at 24.  
136  Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss4/10
10_BHATTACHARJEE_PROOFCORRECTION.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 10/14/2014  8:20 PM 
2014] LEGAL PROTECTION FOR MIGRANT TRAINEES 1173 
the rights of trainees. 
In addition to providing trainees access to legal recourse, such 
an arrangement would incentivize adherence to labor standards by 
both employers and associations.  If trainees are mobile between 
employers in instances where their rights have been violated, 
employers will have an added incentive to adhere to labor 
standards in order to keep workers for a sufficient duration to 
recoup recruitment and training costs.  Moreover, requiring 
associations to find new placements for trainees who have been 
mistreated would require increased interaction between 
associations and their members, increasing opportunities for 
associations to monitor working conditions.   
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